Is logical knowledge dispositional?

Murzi, Julien and Steinberger, Florian (2012) Is logical knowledge dispositional? Philosophical Studies . ISSN 0031-8116 . (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0063-9

Abstract

In a series of recent papers, Corine Besson argues that dispositionalist accounts of logical knowledge conflict with ordinary reasoning. She cites cases in which, rather than applying a logical principle to deduce certain implications of our antecedent beliefs, we revise some of those beliefs in the light of their unpalatable consequences. She argues that such instances of, in Gilbert Harman’s phrase, ‘reasoned change in view’ cannot be accommodated by the dispositionalist approach, and that we would do well to conceive of logical knowledge as a species of propositional knowledge instead. In this paper, we propose a dispositional account that is more general than the one Besson considers, viz. one that does not merely apply to beliefs, and claim that dispositionalists have the resources to account for reasoned change in view. We then raise what we take to be more serious challenges for the dispositionalist view, and sketch some lines of response dispositionalists might offer.

Item Type: Article
Additional information: Ca. 9000 words. 50% contribution by Murzi.
Uncontrolled keywords: Logical knowledge; Change in view; Dispositions; Blameless but blind reasoning; Propositional knowledge
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Fiona Godfrey
Date Deposited: 29 Sep 2012 10:06
Last Modified: 30 Oct 2013 14:31
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/31076 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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