Security specification: completeness, feasibility, refinement

Boiten, Eerke (2010) Security specification: completeness, feasibility, refinement. In: Extended Abstracts Collection -- Refinement Based Methods for the Construction of Dependable Systems, Dagstuhl, Germany. (Full text available)

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Abstract

The formal methods and refinement community should be able to contribute to the specification and verification of security protocols. This talk describes a few of the essential differences, or problems. First, security properties go beyond functional correctness, and are fundamentally different for different applications. Moreover, tomorrow's attacks may not be anticipated by yesterday's security properties. Second, notions of security may not be absolute: it may be good enough if guessing our secret is merely hard rather than impossible - and in some cases that may be provably the best we can get. Where does that leave us in wanting to provide security protocols ''correct by construction''?

Item Type: Conference or workshop item (Paper)
Additional information: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2010/2374
Subjects: Q Science > QA Mathematics (inc Computing science) > QA 76 Software, computer programming,
Divisions: Faculties > Science Technology and Medical Studies > School of Computing > Programming Languages and Systems Group
Faculties > Science Technology and Medical Studies > School of Computing > Security Group
Depositing User: Eerke Boiten
Date Deposited: 21 Sep 2012 09:49
Last Modified: 18 Jul 2014 15:53
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/30692 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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