Kirchin, S.T. (2007) Particularism and Default Valency. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 4 (1). pp. 16-32. ISSN 1740-4681.
In this paper, which draws on some of the distinctions I made and thoughts I gave in my 'Moral Particularism: An Introduction', elsewhere in the volume of JMP, I concentrate on the notion of default valency. In §1 I outline a recent debate that shows why the notion is important for particularists to have up their sleeves, although I do not give a detailed defence of its legitimacy. In §2 I use this notion to comment on how anyone, but particularly particularists, might distinguish reason-generating features into different types. My main aim is not to argue for a specific way of dividing such features into types but to present various taxonomical options.
|Uncontrolled keywords:||ethics • features • generalism • particularism • valency|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages|
|Depositing User:||Simon Kirchin|
|Date Deposited:||13 May 2008 09:19|
|Last Modified:||05 Sep 2011 23:30|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/3047 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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