Regulation, Transport and Regional Performance

Vickerman, Roger W. (2009) Regulation, Transport and Regional Performance. Studies in Regional Science, 39 (1). pp. 5-18. ISSN 0287-6256. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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http://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/srs/39/1/39_5/...

Abstract

ransport provision has a clear relationship to regional economic performance. Since transport is typically provided in a regulated market it is important to understand the ways in which the regulatory regimes can affect the efficient provision of transport. This paper explores ways in which the differential regulation of transport by regional authorities can affect the relative economic performance of regions. The basic hypothesis to be assessed is whether under competing regulatory regimes regions will tend to under-invest or over-invest in their transport provision. In this paper we develop a simple model of regulatory competition in a multi-agency world. The analysis demonstrates how regulatory conflicts can lead to inefficiencies which impact not just on the provision of transport services, but also on the potential wider benefits from transport, most notably labour market efficiency and productivity growth. In some cases this may result in regions over-investing in transport in an attempt to seek competitive advantage; in other cases they may under-invest seeking to benefit from spillovers from the level of investment in neighbouring regions. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy implications and alternatives.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HE Transportation and Communications
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Roger Vickerman
Date Deposited: 30 Mar 2012 11:10
Last Modified: 11 Jun 2014 10:56
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/29238 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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