Generic versus single-case causality: the case of autopsy

Russo, F. and Williamson, J. (2011) Generic versus single-case causality: the case of autopsy. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 1 (1). pp. 47-69. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

The full text of this publication is not available from this repository. (Contact us about this Publication)
Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13194-010-0012-4

Abstract

This paper addresses questions about how the levels of causality (generic and single-case causality) are related. One question is epistemological: can relationships at one level be evidence for relationships at the other level? We present three kinds of answer to this question, categorised according to whether inference is top-down, bottom-up, or the levels are independent. A second question is metaphysical: can relationships at one level be reduced to relationships at the other level? We present three kinds of answer to this second question, categorised according to whether single-case relations are reduced to generic, generic relations are reduced to single-case, or the levels are independent. We then explore causal inference in autopsy. This is an interesting case study, we argue, because it refutes all three epistemologies and all three metaphysics. We close by sketching an account of causality that survives autopsy—the epistemic theory.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
R Medicine > RA Public aspects of medicine > RA1001 Forensic Medicine. Medical jurisprudence. Legal medicine
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Jon Williamson
Date Deposited: 21 Mar 2011 12:54
Last Modified: 20 Jan 2012 15:04
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/27521 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
  • Depositors only (login required):