When deserving translates into causing: The effect of cognitive load on immanent justice reasoning

Callan, Mitch J. and Sutton, Robbie M. (2010) When deserving translates into causing: The effect of cognitive load on immanent justice reasoning. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46 (6). pp. 1097-1100. ISSN 0022-1031. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2010.05.024

Abstract

In immanent justice reasoning, negative events are attributed to some prior moral failing, even in the absence of a physically plausible causal link between them. Drawing on just-world theory, we examined immanent justice reasoning as an intuitive, deservingness-guided form of causal judgment. Participants were exposed to a story about a man who either did or did not cheat on his wife and who was subsequently injured in a car accident. Under either high or low cognitive load, participants rated the extent to which they believed the accident was the result of the man's prior moral failings. The results showed that participants causally attributed the man's accident to his prior conduct when he was immoral (vs. not immoral) more strongly under high cognitive load. Further, moderated mediation analyses showed that perceived deservingness of the accident mediated the effect of the man's prior immoral behavior on immanent justice attributions more strongly under high cognitive load. These results offer support for the notion that immanent justice attributions reflect an automatic tendency to assume that people get what they deserve.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Psychology
Depositing User: Robbie Sutton
Date Deposited: 10 Dec 2010 13:08
Last Modified: 06 Jun 2014 08:43
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/26132 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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