Frowe, Helen (2008) Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25 (4). pp. 277-290. ISSN 1468-5930.
|The full text of this publication is not available from this repository. (Contact us about this Publication)|
Michael Otsuka claims that it is impermissible to kill innocent threats because doing so is morally equivalent to killing bystanders. I show that Otsuka's argument conflates killing as a means with treating a person herself as a means. The killing of a person can be a means only if that person is instrumental in the threat to Victim's life. A permission to kill a person as a means will not permit killing bystanders. I also defend a permission to kill innocent threats against Otsuka's Trolley Cases. Otsuka depicts a person tied to an oncoming trolley as a bystander. I argue that such characters are threats whom Victim can permissibly kill.
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
|Divisions:||Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages|
|Depositing User:||Helen Frowe|
|Date Deposited:||27 Oct 2010 15:52|
|Last Modified:||10 Jan 2012 12:45|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/25969 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
- Depositors only (login required):