Frowe, Helen (2008) Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 25 (4). pp. 277-290. ISSN 1468-5930.
| The full text of this publication is not available from this repository. (Contact us about this Publication) | |
| Official URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2008.00406.x |
Abstract
Michael Otsuka claims that it is impermissible to kill innocent threats because doing so is morally equivalent to killing bystanders. I show that Otsuka's argument conflates killing as a means with treating a person herself as a means. The killing of a person can be a means only if that person is instrumental in the threat to Victim's life. A permission to kill a person as a means will not permit killing bystanders. I also defend a permission to kill innocent threats against Otsuka's Trolley Cases. Otsuka depicts a person tied to an oncoming trolley as a bystander. I argue that such characters are threats whom Victim can permissibly kill.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics |
| Divisions: | Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages |
| Depositing User: | Helen Frowe |
| Date Deposited: | 27 Oct 2010 15:52 |
| Last Modified: | 10 Jan 2012 12:45 |
| Resource URI: | http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/25969 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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