Implications of Policy Incentives for Strategic Control: An Intergrative Model

Chau, V.S. and Witcher, B.J. (2005) Implications of Policy Incentives for Strategic Control: An Intergrative Model. Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 76 (1). pp. 85-119. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Abstract

This paper proposes an internal management perspective of the company, as a complement to longstanding principal-agency theory, for understanding the interchange between regulator and company. It draws from a longitudinal research project on understanding the implications of regulation policy incentives for strategic control in the management of UK monopoly network utilities and the management implications of regulatory policy making. This paper reports on how two utility companies have managed regulatory objectives alongside organizational ones in electricity distribution and gas transportation and suggests a new integrative model of strategic control for understanding utility management. It concludes if regulation policies are to be effective then regulators should understand the internal management of the companies if performance targets are to be attained.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > Kent Business School > International Business and Strategy
Depositing User: J. Ziya
Date Deposited: 23 Sep 2010 14:52
Last Modified: 23 Sep 2010 14:52
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/25561 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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