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On the interaction between efficiency wages and union firm bargaining models

Sanfey, Peter (1993) On the interaction between efficiency wages and union firm bargaining models. Economics Letters, 41 (3). pp. 319-324. ISSN 0165-1765. (doi:10.1016/0165-1765(93)90160-E) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:20656)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided.
Official URL:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(93)90160-E

Abstract

Even when efficiency wage considerations are taken into account, firms may have no incentive to pay wages above the competitive minimum. The total value of output therefore may be increased if workers in the efficiency wage sector also possess bargaining power. Efficiency wage and insider-outsider models may also reinforce each other.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1016/0165-1765(93)90160-E
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Human and Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: O.O. Odanye
Date Deposited: 25 Jul 2009 01:40 UTC
Last Modified: 16 Nov 2021 09:58 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/20656 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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