Goldstein, Laurence (2009) A Consistent Way with Paradox. Philosophical Studies, 144 (3). pp. 377-389. ISSN 0031-8116 .
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| Official URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9215-3 |
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Abstract
Consideration of a paradox originally discovered by John Buridan provides a springboard for a general solution to paradoxes within the Liar family. The solution rests on a philosophical defence of truth-value-gaps and is consistent (non-dialetheist), avoids ‘revenge’ problems, imports no ad hoc assumptions, is not applicable to only a proper subset of the semantic paradoxes and implies no restriction of the expressive capacities of language.
| Item Type: | Article |
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| Uncontrolled keywords: | Paradox; Consistent; Cassationist; Liar; No-no; Buridan |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Divisions: | Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages |
| Depositing User: | Laurence Goldstein |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Nov 2009 14:44 |
| Last Modified: | 06 Sep 2011 03:09 |
| Resource URI: | http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/19651 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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