High and low trusters responses to fear in a payoff matrix

Parks, C.D. and Hulbert, L.G. (1995) High and low trusters responses to fear in a payoff matrix. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39 (4). pp. 718-730. ISSN 0022-0027. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002795039004006

Abstract

Interpersonal trust has long been known to influence cooperation. This study tested the hypothesis that one's degree of trust in others will influence the extent to which one reacts to the presence of fear (or the possibility of receiving no payoff for cooperative actions) in a payoff matrix. The hypothesis was formally tested with public goods games and resource dilemma games, with fear manipulated. Results support the hypothesis: when fear was present, high trusters cooperated more frequently than low trusters; when absent, high and low trusters cooperated at the same rate. The findings held across both games. However, the effects of fear within each game were not straightforward: removing fear from the resource dilemma increased low trusters' cooperation rates, but removing fear from the public goods game decreased high trusters' cooperation rates. Results imply that discussion of the role of trust in cooperation must consider whether the particular dilemma contains an element of fear.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: J Political Science
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
Depositing User: O.O. Odanye
Date Deposited: 28 May 2009 17:33
Last Modified: 27 Jun 2012 09:17
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/19438 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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