Craven, J. (1996) Majority-consistent preference orderings. Social Choice and Welfare, 13 (3). pp. 259-267. ISSN 0176-1714.
| The full text of this publication is not available from this repository. (Contact us about this Publication) |
Abstract
This paper considers the construction of sets of preferences that give consistent outcomes under majority voting. Fishburn [7] shows that by combining the concepts of single-Peaked and single-troughed preferences (which are themselves examples of value restriction) it is possible to provide a simple description of the extent of agreement between individuals that allows the construction of sets that are as large as those previously known (for fewer than 7 alternatives) and larger than those previously known (for 7 or more alternatives). This paper gives a characterisation of the preferences generated through these agreements and makes observations on the relation between the sizes of such sets as the number of alternatives increases.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| Depositing User: | M.A. Ziai |
| Date Deposited: | 07 Sep 2009 12:12 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Sep 2009 12:12 |
| Resource URI: | http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/18894 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
- Depositors only (login required):
