Craven, J. (1996) Majority-consistent preference orderings. Social Choice and Welfare, 13 (3). pp. 259-267. ISSN 0176-1714.
|The full text of this publication is not available from this repository. (Contact us about this Publication)|
This paper considers the construction of sets of preferences that give consistent outcomes under majority voting. Fishburn  shows that by combining the concepts of single-Peaked and single-troughed preferences (which are themselves examples of value restriction) it is possible to provide a simple description of the extent of agreement between individuals that allows the construction of sets that are as large as those previously known (for fewer than 7 alternatives) and larger than those previously known (for 7 or more alternatives). This paper gives a characterisation of the preferences generated through these agreements and makes observations on the relation between the sizes of such sets as the number of alternatives increases.
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences
H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
|Divisions:||Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics|
|Depositing User:||M.A. Ziai|
|Date Deposited:||07 Sep 2009 12:12|
|Last Modified:||07 Sep 2009 12:12|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/18894 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
- Depositors only (login required):