Social norms: Does it matter whether agents are rational or boundedly rational?

Cartwright, E.J. (2009) Social norms: Does it matter whether agents are rational or boundedly rational? Journal of Socio Economics, 38 (3). pp. 403-410. ISSN 1053-5357. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2009.02.008

Abstract

The motivation for this paper is to consider whether changes in conformity over time are likely to depend critically on agent behavior. To get some insight on this we use the framework of Chamley [Chamley, C., 1999. Coordinating regime switches. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 869–905] and compare the dynamic of conformity in a setting where agents are rational to one where they are adaptive (or backward looking). This is followed by a more general discussion on the issue.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Conformity Social norms Adaptive Rational
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 27 Nov 2009 11:17
Last Modified: 27 Nov 2009 11:17
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/18252 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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