Cartwright, Edward and Wooders, Myrna (2009) On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players. International Journal of Game Theory, 38 (1). pp. 137-153. ISSN 0020-7276.
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| Official URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0150-5 |
Abstract
We demonstrate that, if there are sufficiently many players, any Bayesian equilibrium of an incomplete information game can be “ε-purified” . That is, close to any Bayesian equilibrium there is an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies. Our main contribution is obtaining this result for games with a countable set of pure strategies. In order to do so we derive a mathematical result, in the spirit of the Shapley–Folkman Theorem, permitting countable strategy sets. Our main assumption is a “large game property,” dictating that the actions of relatively small subsets of players cannot have large affects on the payoffs of other players.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled keywords: | Bayesian equilibrium; Purification; Large games; Semi-anonymity; Ex-post stability; Shapley-Folkman Theorem; Countable strategy space |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Divisions: | Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics |
| Depositing User: | Edward Cartwright |
| Date Deposited: | 26 Nov 2009 15:27 |
| Last Modified: | 26 Nov 2009 15:27 |
| Resource URI: | http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/15477 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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