Cartwright, Edward and Wooders, Myrna (2009) On equilibrium in pure strategies in games with many players. International Journal of Game Theory, 38 (1). pp. 137-153. ISSN 0020-7276.
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We demonstrate that, if there are sufficiently many players, any Bayesian equilibrium of an incomplete information game can be “ε-purified” . That is, close to any Bayesian equilibrium there is an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies. Our main contribution is obtaining this result for games with a countable set of pure strategies. In order to do so we derive a mathematical result, in the spirit of the Shapley–Folkman Theorem, permitting countable strategy sets. Our main assumption is a “large game property,” dictating that the actions of relatively small subsets of players cannot have large affects on the payoffs of other players.
|Uncontrolled keywords:||Bayesian equilibrium; Purification; Large games; Semi-anonymity; Ex-post stability; Shapley-Folkman Theorem; Countable strategy space|
|Subjects:||H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics|
|Depositing User:||Edward Cartwright|
|Date Deposited:||26 Nov 2009 15:27|
|Last Modified:||26 Nov 2009 15:27|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/15477 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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