On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium

Cartwright, Edward and Wooders, Myrna (2009) On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium. International Journal of Game Theory, 38 (1). pp. 127-136. ISSN 0020-7276. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0149-y

Abstract

Treating games of incomplete information, we demonstrate that the existence of an ex post stable strategy vector implies the existence of an approximate Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies that is also expost stable. Through examples we demonstrate the ‘bounds obtained on the approximation’ are tight.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Semi-anonymous games; Purification; Expost Nash; Bayesian equilibrium
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Edward Cartwright
Date Deposited: 27 Nov 2009 10:04
Last Modified: 27 Nov 2009 10:04
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/15476 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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