Pesticides,preference heterogeneity and environmental taxes

Chalak, Ali and Balcombe, Kelvin and Bailey, Alastair and Fraser, Iain M (2008) Pesticides,preference heterogeneity and environmental taxes. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 59 (3). pp. 537-554. ISSN 0021-857X. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-9552.2008.00163.x

Abstract

In this paper we present results from two choice experiments (CE),designed to take account of the different negative externalities associated with pesticide use in agricultural production.For cereal production,the most probable impact of pesticide use is a reduction in environmental quality.For fruit and vegetable production,the negative externality is on consumer health.Using latent class models we find evidence of the presence of preference heterogeneity in addition to reasonably high willingness to pay (WTP) estimates for a reduction in the use of pesticides for both environmental quality and consumer health.To place our WTP estimates in a policy context we convert them into an equivalent pesticide tax by type of externality.Our tax estimates suggest that pesticide taxes based on the primary externality resulting from a particular mode of agricultural production are a credible policy option that warrants further consideration.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: choice experiments latent class models pesticide taxes pesticides willingness to pay
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions
S Agriculture
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Economics
Depositing User: Suzanne Duffy
Date Deposited: 10 Feb 2009 11:41
Last Modified: 15 Apr 2014 14:27
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/14965 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
ORCiD (Chalak, Ali):
ORCiD (Balcombe, Kelvin):
ORCiD (Bailey, Alastair):
ORCiD (Fraser, Iain M):
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