Williamson, J. (2007) Inductive influence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 58 (4). pp. 689-708. ISSN 0007-0882.
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Objective Bayesianism has been criticised for not allowing learning from experience: it is claimed that an agent must give degree of belief 12 to the next raven being black, however many other black ravens have been observed. I argue that this objection can be overcome by appealing to objective Bayesian nets, a formalism for representing objective Bayesian degrees of belief. Under this account, previous observations exert an inductive influence on the next observation. I show how this approach can be used to capture the Johnson-Carnap continuum of inductive methods, as well as the Nix-Paris continuum, and show how inductive influence can be measured.
|Additional information:||This paper demonstrated that it is, after all, possible for the objective Bayesian to learn from experience.|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages|
|Depositing User:||Maureen Nunn|
|Date Deposited:||19 Dec 2007 18:50|
|Last Modified:||20 Jan 2012 15:11|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1292 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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