Motivating Objective Bayesianism: From Empirical Constraints to Objective Probabilities

Williamson, Jon (2007) Motivating Objective Bayesianism: From Empirical Constraints to Objective Probabilities. In: Harper, W.L. and Wheeler, G.R., eds. Probability and Inference: Essays in Honour of Henry E. Kyburg Jr. College Publications, London, UK, pp. 155-183. ISBN 9781904987185. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Abstract

Objective Bayesian methodology is widely used in statistics, physics, engineering and artificial intelligence. However, every justification for this method has contained glaring holes. This paper offered an entirely new, decision-theoretic justification of objective Bayesianism. Kyburg goes half-way towards objective Bayesianism. He accepts that frequencies constrain rational belief to an interval but stops short of isolating an optimal degree of belief within this interval. I examine the case for going the whole hog.

Item Type: Book section
Additional information: This paper offered an entirely new, decision-theoretic justification of objective Bayesianism.
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Maureen Nunn
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:50
Last Modified: 02 Jun 2014 08:36
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1291 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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