Thomas, Alan P (2003) An Adverbial Theory of Consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2 (3). pp. 161-185. ISSN 1568-7759.
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Abstract
The importance of this paper is that it further develops a novel approach to the problem of consciousness. An account of person level and state level consciousness are developed together, where ‘consciously’ modifies exercises of the mental acts of a whole person. Consciousness is distinguished from self-knowledge and a Neo-Brentanian identity theory of their mutual relation is rejected. A theory of self-knowledge is outlined, grounded on globally based self-ascription. The bearing of this theory on the unity of consciousness is explained. This paper has been cited by leading experts in the field such as Zahavi, Rowlands and Thomasson.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| Divisions: | Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages |
| Depositing User: | Maureen Nunn |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Dec 2007 18:50 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Jan 2010 14:02 |
| Resource URI: | http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1288 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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