Reasonable Partiality and the Agent's Point of View

Thomas, Alan P. (2005) Reasonable Partiality and the Agent's Point of View. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 8 (1-2). pp. 25-43. ISSN 1386-2820. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

The full text of this publication is not available from this repository. (Contact us about this Publication)

Abstract

The importance of this paper is that develops an interdisciplinary approach to foundational issues in meta-ethics and moral psychology. It is argued that our best theories of consciousness and self-knowledge show that virtue ethics alone can explain the sense in which our relation to our own character is non-alienating. This implies that virtue ethics cannot be a derived component of other normative ethical theories such as consequentialism. After publication this paper was presented, by invitation, to the AHRC project on partiality and impartiality in ethics and has been cited in more recent discussions of integrity and moral character.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Maureen Nunn
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:50
Last Modified: 10 Jun 2014 08:33
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1286 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
  • Depositors only (login required):