Tanney, J. (2002) Self-knowledge, Normativity, and Construction. Logic, Thought and Language, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 51 . pp. 37-55. ISSN 1358-2461.
|The full text of this publication is not available from this repository. (Contact us about this Publication)|
This article develops the idea that the ‘compossibility of objectivity, discovery, and invention’ is part of our ordinary (non-theoretical, non-scientific) understanding of the mental. Contemporary theories in the philosophy of mind, which are broadly speaking “realist” fail to make sense of this compossibility: they fail, in particular, to make sense of the inventive aspects of self-ascription. The invited article is in a small collection published by the Royal Institute of Philosophy as a supplement to the journal Philosophy. This particular volume is remarkable as it includes articles from a number of eminent philosophers, including R.M. Sainsbury, David Wiggins, Gregory McCulloch, Crispin Wright, Christopher Peacocke, Timothy Williams, and Charles Travis.
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages|
|Depositing User:||Maureen Nunn|
|Date Deposited:||19 Dec 2007 18:49|
|Last Modified:||07 Feb 2012 12:53|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1238 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
- Depositors only (login required):