Kirchin, S.T. (2003) Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 6 (3). pp. 241-264. ISSN 1386-2820.
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Abstract
In this piece I try to nail a train of thought that is offered, typically by realists against anti-realists, as a reason for thinking that our raw moral phenomenology provides a reason to prefer moral realism. This idea is referred to often, but is rarely detailed. I argue that various arguments that one can devise which are in keeping with this train of thought fail. I conclude by saying, controversially, that moral phenomenology is fairly irrelevant when thinking about metaethics. This paper has been cited by a number of people in their recent work (for example, Horgan and Timmons, Loeb).
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BJ Ethics |
| Divisions: | Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages |
| Depositing User: | Maureen Nunn |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Dec 2007 18:48 |
| Last Modified: | 22 Nov 2011 15:37 |
| Resource URI: | http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1219 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes) |
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