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Particularism, Generalism and the Counting Argument

Kirchin, Simon T. (2003) Particularism, Generalism and the Counting Argument. European Journal of Philosophy, 11 (1). pp. 54-71. ISSN 0966-8373. (doi:10.1111/1468-0378.00174) (The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided) (KAR id:1216)

The full text of this publication is not currently available from this repository. You may be able to access a copy if URLs are provided.
Official URL:
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0378.00174

Abstract

In this paper I argue for a particularist understanding of thick evaluative features, something that is rarely done and is fairly controversial. That is, I argue that sometimes that the fact that an act is just, say, could, in certain situations, provide one with a reason against performing the action. Similarly, selfishness could be right-making. To show this, I take on anti-particularist ideas from two much-cited pieces (by Crisp, and by McNaughton and Rawling), in the influential Moral Particularism anthology (eds.) Hooker and Little (OUP). My paper has already been cited by other people working in the field.

Item Type: Article
DOI/Identification number: 10.1111/1468-0378.00174
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Divisions: Divisions > Division of Arts and Humanities > School of Culture and Languages
Depositing User: Maureen Nunn
Date Deposited: 19 Dec 2007 18:48 UTC
Last Modified: 09 Mar 2023 11:29 UTC
Resource URI: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/1216 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)

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