Tanney, J. (1999) “Normativity and Thought". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume , 73 (1). pp. 45-61.
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This paper attempts to describe why it is not possible to account for normative phenomena in non-normative terms. It argues that Papineau’s attempt to locate norms of judgement ‘outside’ content, grounded in an individual’s desires or reasons, mislocates the normativity that is thought to resist appropriation within a ‘world that conceives nature as the realm of law’. It agrees, however, that a theory of content that locates norms ‘inside’ content will not be forthcoming—at least if this is to require fashioning the norms that in some sense govern judgment or thought into individually necessary conditions for contentful states.
|Additional information:||this article is published as: "Normalivity and Judgment"|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages|
|Depositing User:||Julia Tanney|
|Date Deposited:||14 Jun 2009 18:05|
|Last Modified:||07 Feb 2012 12:53|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/11272 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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