Curbing the Deficit: Democracy After the European Constitution

Azmanova, Albena (2004) Curbing the Deficit: Democracy After the European Constitution. Imprints, vol.8 (1). pp. 7-49. ISSN 1363-5964. (Access to this publication is restricted)

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Abstract

This study assesses the democratic potential of the draft Constitutional Treaty for Europe. It reviews the various sources of the democratic deficit in the European Union and examines the effect of some of the provisions of the draft Constitutional Treaty on the quality of democracy at national and supranational level. The institutional strategies contained in the Treaty collide to create a policy dilemma: increasing democratic input or enhancing political accountability. It is argued that embracing the path of accountability, rather than that of democratic input, as a reform formula, would allow us to solve the EU democratic deficit without undermining the Union's institutional efficiency, and without jeopardising the formation of a European political community. This line of institutional development is in tune with the post-sovereign and post-national nature of power relations on the continent in the early twenty-first century.

Item Type: Article
Subjects: H Social Sciences
Divisions: Faculties > Social Sciences > School of Politics and International Relations
Depositing User: Albena Azmanova
Date Deposited: 06 Oct 2008 08:18
Last Modified: 06 Sep 2011 00:40
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/10891 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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