Russo, F. (2006) Salmon and van Fraassen on the existence of unobservable entities: a matter of interpretation of probability. Foundations of Science, 11 (3). pp. 221-247. ISSN 1233-1821.
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A careful analysis of Salmon’s Theoretical Realism and van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism shows that both share a common origin: the requirement of literal construal of theories inherited by the Standard View. However, despite this common starting point, Salmon and van Fraassen strongly disagree on the existence of unobservable entities. I argue that their different ontological commitment towards the existence of unobservable traces back to their different views on the interpretation of probability via different conceptions of induction. In fact, inferences to statements claiming the existence of unobservable entities are inferences to probabilistic statements, whence the crucial importance of the interpretation of probability.
|Additional information:||Special issue on Causal Pluralism|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages|
|Depositing User:||Fiona Godfrey|
|Date Deposited:||30 Oct 2008 18:45|
|Last Modified:||14 Jan 2010 14:41|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/10822 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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