Tanney, J. (2008) Reasons as Non-Causal, Context-Placing Explanations. In: Sandis, Constantine, ed. New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave MacMillan. ISBN 9780230522022.
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Philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein rejected the idea that the explanatory power of our ordinary interpretive practices is to be found in law-governed, causal relations between items to which our everyday mental terms allegedly refer. Wittgenstein and those he inspired pointed to differences between the explanations provided by the ordinary employment of mental expressions and the style of causal explanation characteristic of the hard sciences. I believe, however, that the particular non-causalism espoused by the Wittgensteinians is today ill- understood. The position does not, for example, find its place on a map that charts the territory disputed by mental realists and their irrealist opponents. In this paper, I take a few steps toward reintroducing this ill-understood position by sketching my own understanding of it and explaining why it fits so uncomfortably within the contemporary metaphysical landscape.
|Item Type:||Book section|
|Subjects:||B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion|
|Divisions:||Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages|
|Depositing User:||Julia Tanney|
|Date Deposited:||15 Apr 2009 13:54|
|Last Modified:||07 Feb 2012 12:53|
|Resource URI:||http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/10605 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)|
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