Real Rules

Tanney, Julia (2009) Real Rules. Synthese, 171 (3). pp. 499-507. ISSN 0039-7857. (The full text of this publication is not available from this repository)

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Official URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9326-6

Abstract

Crispin Wright has for many years expressed frustration at Wittgenstein’s ‘quietism’ —his refusal to offer substantive answers to the metaphysical and epistemological problems that are raised, Wright alleges, by Wittgenstein’s own reflections on rules. In a recent paper Wright suggests this quietism can be explained by Wittgenstein’s rejection of a picture that seems to indicate Platonism and communitarianism as the only available solutions to these ostensible metaphysical and epistemological problems. I agree with Wright that Wittgenstein would reject the initial assumptions that pit the realist against the communitarian, but I tell my own story on behalf of Wittgenstein about what is wrong with the altogether misconceived picture that generates the dilemma.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled keywords: Communitarianism · Language-games · Normativity · Platonism · Realism · Rule-following · Ryle · Wittgenstein
Subjects: B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
Divisions: Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages
Faculties > Humanities > School of European Culture and Languages > Philosophy
Depositing User: Julia Tanney
Date Deposited: 20 Mar 2009 15:22
Last Modified: 08 Nov 2014 13:14
Resource URI: http://kar.kent.ac.uk/id/eprint/10590 (The current URI for this page, for reference purposes)
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